

ANNEE UNIVERSITAIRE 20__ / 20__ Session : _____

U.E. _____

Épreuve de _____

Note de
l'épreuve

(*) Le candidat doit inscrire ici : ses noms, prénoms, lieu et date de naissance, puis rabattre suivant le pointillé le coin de la copie et le coller.

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(1) We know that at time n , the wealth is W_n . The capital invested in the risky asset is $\hat{\alpha}_n W_n$ so that the numbers of shares that are detained is $\frac{1}{S_n} \hat{\alpha}_n W_n$.

We get $\frac{1}{S_n} \hat{\alpha}_n W_n D$ as a dividend.

$$\text{Therefore: } W_{n+1} = \underbrace{\hat{\alpha}_n W_n}_{\substack{\text{capital} \\ \text{in the risky asset}}} \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^n}_{\substack{\text{evolution} \\ \text{of the capital}}} + \underbrace{\frac{\hat{\alpha}_n W_n D}{S_n}}_{\text{Dividend}} + \underbrace{(1-\hat{\alpha}_n) W_n (1+r)}_{\substack{\text{evolution of} \\ \text{the capital in} \\ \text{the non risky asset}}}$$

Since $\hat{\alpha}_n \in [0,1]$ $W_{n+1}^{\hat{\alpha}_n} \geq 0$.

(2) (a) We write:

$$\sup_{\hat{\alpha} \in [0,1]} \mathbb{E} [V(W_1^{\hat{\alpha}})] = \sup_{\hat{\alpha} \in [0,1]} \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\hat{\alpha} x \left(\frac{3}{8} + \frac{D}{8} \right) + (1-\hat{\alpha}) x (1+r) \right)^q \right]$$

$$\left\{ \sup_{\hat{\alpha} \geq 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\hat{\alpha} \left(\frac{3}{8} + \frac{D}{8} \right) + (1-\hat{\alpha}) (1+r) \right)^q \right] \right\}$$

$$= x^q \sup_{\hat{\alpha} \in [0,1]} \mathbb{E} \left[\left[\hat{\alpha} \left(\frac{3}{8} + \frac{D}{8} \right) + (1-\hat{\alpha}) (1+r) \right]^q \right].$$

$e(\hat{\alpha})$

We notice that $e(\hat{\alpha}) \geq 0$ since $\hat{\alpha} \in [0,1]$ in the \mathbb{E} . We even

have $c(\lambda) > 0$.

We check that c is non-increasing.

Take $0 < \lambda < \lambda'$. Since \hat{z} is taken in $[\lambda, \lambda']$ in the E that defines the reward function, it suffices to notice that

$$\forall \hat{z} \in [\lambda, \lambda'] \quad \hat{z} \geq \frac{D}{\lambda'} < 2 \geq \frac{D}{\lambda}$$

so that

$$\left[\hat{z} \left(\frac{D}{\lambda'} + (1-\hat{z}) \right) + (1-\hat{z}) \right]^q$$

$$< \left[2 \left(\frac{D}{\lambda'} + (1-\hat{z}) \right) + (1-\hat{z}) \right]^q$$

Taking the expectation and then the supremum over \hat{z} , we complete the proof.

(b) We consider the function (the value of α being given)

$$J(\hat{z}) = \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\hat{z} \left(\frac{D}{\alpha} + (1-\hat{z}) \right) + (1-\hat{z}) \right)^q \right]$$

for $\hat{z} \in [0, 1]$

$$= p \left[\hat{z} \left[\mu + \frac{D}{\alpha} - (1-\hat{z}) \right] + 1-\hat{z} \right]^q$$

$$+ (1-p) \left[\hat{z} \left[d + \frac{D}{\alpha} - (1-\hat{z}) \right] \right]^q$$

We notice that J is twice differentiable in \hat{a} on $[0,1]$.
We compute J'' . It reads:

$$J''(\hat{a}) = p q(q-1) \left[\mu + \frac{p}{\delta} - (1+n) \right]^2 \left[\hat{a} \left[\mu + \frac{p}{\delta} - (1+n) \right] + (1+n) \right]^{q-2} \\ + (1-p) q(q-1) \left[d + \frac{p}{\delta} - (1+n) \right]^2 \left[\hat{a} \left[d + \frac{p}{\delta} - (1+n) \right] + (1+n) \right]^{q-2}.$$

We see that $p q(q-1) < 0$ $(1-p) q(q-1) < 0$.
Moreover, since $d < \mu$, we have

$$\left[\mu + \frac{p}{\delta} - (1+n) \right]^2 < 0 \text{ and } \left[d + \frac{p}{\delta} - (1+n) \right]^2 < 0.$$

Now:

$$\hat{a} \left[\mu + \frac{p}{\delta} - (1+n) \right] + (1+n) = \hat{a} \left(\mu + \frac{p}{\delta} \right) + (1+n)(1-\hat{a}) > 0.$$

$$\hat{a} \left[d + \frac{p}{\delta} - (1+n) \right] + (1+n) = \hat{a} \left(d + \frac{p}{\delta} \right) + (1+n)(1-\hat{a}) > 0.$$

Therefore $J''(\hat{a}) < 0 \quad \forall \hat{a} \in [0,1]$.

By concavity the function J admits a unique maximum.

Of course the maximum does not depend on n since J does not depend on n .

(3) (a) S_n may be $S_0 d u^{n-k}$ for k ranging along $\{0, \dots, n\}$. These are always > 0 values.

(b) By definition $U_n(x, x) = U(x)$.

(c) We expect that:

$$U_n(x, \lambda) = \sup_{\hat{a} \in [0,1]} E \left[U_{n+1} (W_{n+1}, S_{n+1}) \right]$$

$$\text{where in the sup: } \begin{cases} W_{n+1} = x \hat{a} \left(3 + \frac{p}{\delta} \right) + (1+n)x(1-\hat{a}) \\ S_{n+1} = \lambda S_n \end{cases}$$

(4) (a) We proceed by induction

Assume that $U_{n+1}(z, s) = c_n(s)z^{\beta}$

for any $z \geq 0$ at some time $n+1 \leq N$.
 $s \geq 0$

Then, D.P.P says that

$$U_n(z, s) = \sup_{\hat{a} \in [0,1]} \mathbb{E} \left[c_{n+1}(s, \hat{z}) \left\{ z \hat{a} \left(\frac{s}{\beta} + \frac{\beta}{s} \right) + (1+\mu)(1-\hat{a})z \right\}^{\beta} \right]$$

$$= z^{\beta} \sup_{\hat{a} \in [0,1]} \mathbb{E} \left[c_{n+1}(s, \hat{z}) \left\{ \hat{a} \left(\frac{s}{\beta} + \frac{\beta}{s} \right) + (1+\mu)(1-\hat{a}) \right\}^{\beta} \right]$$

\downarrow
 since $z^{\beta} \geq 0$

We get $c_{n+1}(s)$

If $c_n(s) \geq 0$
 then $c_{n+1}(s) \geq 0$.

Assume that c_{n+1} is non-increasing. Then for any $\hat{a} \in [0,1]$
 we must have (since "everything" is non-negative) that
 the function

$$R_+^* \ni s \mapsto c_{n+1}(s, \hat{z}) \left\{ \hat{a} \left(\frac{s}{\beta} + \frac{\beta}{s} \right) + (1+\mu)(1-\hat{a}) \right\}^{\beta}$$

is non-increasing whatever the realization of \hat{z} is.
 Proceeding as in question (2a), we deduce that c_n is
 non-increasing.

(b) The induction shows that $c_0 = 1$

and

$$c_n(s) = \sup_{\hat{a} \in [0,1]} \mathbb{E} \left[c_{n+1}(s, \hat{z}) \left\{ \hat{a} \left(\frac{s}{\beta} + \frac{\beta}{s} \right) + (1+\mu)(1-\hat{a}) \right\}^{\beta} \right]$$

(c) At time n , the financial agent has to optimize
 the above reward. Namely, he/she must solve

$$c_n^*(s) = \sup_{\hat{a} \in [0,1]} \mathbb{E} \left[c_{n+1}(s, \hat{z}) \left\{ \hat{a} \left(\frac{s}{\beta} + \frac{\beta}{s} \right) + (1+\mu)(1-\hat{a}) \right\}^{\beta} \right]$$

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We proceed as in question (2b). We write:

$$\begin{aligned} & E \left[c_{n+1}(s) \left\{ \hat{a} \left(s + \frac{p}{s} \right) + (1-p)(1-\hat{a}) \right\}^n \right] \\ &= p c_{n+1}(sa) \left\{ \hat{a} \left(sa + \frac{p}{s} \right) + (1-p)(1-\hat{a}) \right\}^n \\ &+ (1-p) c_{n+1}(sd) \left\{ \hat{a} \left(sd + \frac{p}{s} \right) + (1-p)(1-\hat{a}) \right\}^n. \end{aligned} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{We call it} \\ F_n(\hat{a}) \end{array} \right\}$$

F_n is twice differentiable and we may prove that

$$F_n''(\hat{a}) < 0 \quad \forall \hat{a} \in [0,1]$$

by the same argument as in question (2b). We must only pay attention to the fact that, by induction, the coefficients $c_{n+1}(sa)$ and $c_{n+1}(sd)$ must be > 0 .

Conclusion. F_n is strictly concave and must have a unique maximum on $[0,1]$. We denote it by $\hat{a}_n^*(s)$.

At time n , the financial agent proceed with the allocation by computing

$$\hat{a}_n^*(S_n)$$

The only needed information is the spot price S_n at time n .

Question (5)

(a) Starting from a wealth x at time n , the wealth at time $n+1$ reads:

$$x \hat{\alpha} \bar{z} + x(1-\hat{\alpha})(1+r) \quad (\text{No dividend since } D=0)$$

When $\bar{z} = u$, we get

$$\begin{aligned} x \hat{\alpha} u + x(1-\hat{\alpha})(1+r) &= x \hat{\alpha} \{u - (1+r)\} + x(1+r) \\ &\geq - \frac{x(1+r)}{u - (1+r)} \end{aligned}$$

$$\geq -x(1+r) + x(1+r) = 0$$

Similarly when $\bar{z} = d$, we get

$$\begin{aligned} x \hat{\alpha} d + x(1-\hat{\alpha})(1+r) &= x \hat{\alpha} \{d - (1+r)\} + x(1+r) \\ &\leq \frac{x(1+r)}{1+r-d} \end{aligned}$$

$$\geq -x(1+r) + x(1+r) = 0$$

(b) As in question (a) we must get:

$$a = \sup_{\hat{a}} E \left\{ \left(\hat{a} \frac{1}{2} u + (1-\hat{a})(1+u) \right)^q \right\}.$$

$$\frac{1+u}{u-(1+u)} \leq \hat{a} \leq \frac{1+u}{1+u-d}$$

which is independent of a .

We are to compute the maximum. We let

$$\begin{aligned} J(\hat{a}) &= E \left\{ \left(\hat{a} \frac{1}{2} u + (1-\hat{a})(1+u) \right)^q \right\} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \hat{a} u + (1-\hat{a})(1+u) \right\}^q + (1-\hat{a}) \left\{ \hat{a} d + (1-\hat{a})(1+u) \right\}^q \end{aligned}$$

J is differentiable and

$$\begin{aligned} J'(\hat{a}) &= [u-(1+u)] \frac{q}{2} \left\{ \hat{a} \frac{1}{2} u + (1-\hat{a})(1+u) \right\}^{q-1} \\ &\quad + [d-(1+u)] \frac{q}{2} \left\{ \hat{a} d + (1-\hat{a})(1+u) \right\}^{q-1} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Therefore } J'(\hat{a}) = 0 &\Leftrightarrow [u-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}} \left[\hat{a} \frac{1}{2} u + (1-\hat{a})(1+u) \right] \\ &= [d-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}} \left[\hat{a} d + (1-\hat{a})(1+u) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

this is equivalent to

$$J'(\hat{a}) = 0 \Leftrightarrow \hat{a} = \frac{[1+u] - [u-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}} + [d-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}}}{[u-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}} + [d-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}}}$$

Therefore:

$$\left[\frac{1}{2} u - [1+u] + 1+u \right] + [1+u] \left[1 + \frac{[d-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}} [u-(1+u)] - [u-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}} [d-(1+u)]}{[u-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}} + [d-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}}} \right]$$

$$= [1+u] [d-(1+u)]^{\frac{1}{q-1}} \left[\frac{1}{2} (d-1) + u - \frac{1}{2} (d-1) \right] \geq 0$$

(1)

Similarly

$$\# \left\{ d - (d+r) \right\} + d+r = (d+r) \left[1 + \frac{(d+r-d)(u-(d+r))^{1/q-1} - (d+r-d)^{1/q-1}}{(u-(d+r))^{1/q-1} + (d+r-d)^{1/q-1}} \right]$$

(2)

$$= \frac{(d+r)(u-(d+r))^{1/q-1}}{(u-(d+r))^{1/q-1} + (d+r-d)^{1/q-1}} (u-d) \geq 0.$$

Therefore $\#$ is admissible.

Of course, it is well-checked that \mathcal{J} has a unique maximum as in question (2b). It must be the zero of the derivative that is $\#$.

We compute the reward associated with d^* :

$$c_{\text{max}} = \frac{1}{2} [d^*(u-(d+r)) + d+r]^q + \frac{1}{2} [d^*(d-(d+r)) + d+r]^q$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} (d+r)^q (u-d)^q \frac{(u-(d+r))^{q/q-1} + (d+r-d)^{q/q-1}}{[u-(d+r)]^{q/q-1} + (d+r-d)^{q/q-1}}$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} (d+r)^q (u-d)^q \frac{1}{[u-(d+r)]^{q/q-1} + (d+r-d)^{q/q-1}}$$

(c) $\mathbb{E}z = \frac{1}{2} u + \frac{1}{2} d = 1+p$

$$\begin{aligned} V(z) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\frac{z}{2} - (1+p) \right)^2 \right] = \frac{1}{2} (u - (d+r))^2 + \frac{1}{2} (d - (d+r))^2 \\ &= \frac{1}{2} a^2 + \frac{1}{2} a^2 = a^2. \end{aligned}$$

$\mu > r$ would make sense to emphasize the fact that, in the mean, the risky asset should "pay" more than the non-risky asset. It would be a kind of reward for its counterpart of the risk.

(d) if $\mu = r$

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$$c = \frac{(1+r)^T}{2} \frac{(1-a)^T}{[a^{T/q-1} + a^{T/q-1}]^{q-1}}$$

$$= \frac{(1+r)^T}{2} \frac{(1-a)^T}{2^{T-1} a^T} = (1+r)^T$$

The investment consists in putting all the money in the non-risky asset. This is the reason why we do not see a . Indeed, since the mean benefit of the risky asset is equal to the benefit of the non-risky, the agent prefers to invest in the non-risky asset, which is secure.

(e) We let $\Delta t = T/N$, $r = \rho \Delta t$, $\mu = \lambda \Delta t$, $\sigma = \sigma \sqrt{\Delta t}$

then

$$c = \frac{(1+\rho \Delta t)^T}{2} \frac{2^T \sigma^T \Delta t^{T/2}}{[(1+\rho \Delta t + \sigma \Delta t)^{T/q-1} + (1+\rho \Delta t - \sigma \Delta t)^{T/q-1}]^{q-1}}$$

$$= \frac{(1+\rho \Delta t)^T}{2} \frac{2^T \sigma^T \Delta t^{T/2}}{\sigma^T \Delta t^{T/2} [(1 + \frac{\rho}{\sigma} \sqrt{\Delta t})^{T/q-1} + (1 - \frac{\rho}{\sigma} \sqrt{\Delta t})^{T/q-1}]^{q-1}}$$

Now:

$$\left(1 + \frac{1}{\sigma} \sqrt{\Delta t}\right)^{q/q-1} = 1 + \frac{1}{\sigma} \frac{q}{q-1} \sqrt{\Delta t} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1^2}{\sigma^2} \Delta t \underbrace{\frac{q}{q-1} \frac{q}{q-1}}_q + O(\Delta t^{3/2})$$

$$\left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \sqrt{\Delta t}\right)^{q/q-1} = 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \frac{q}{q-1} \sqrt{\Delta t} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1^2}{\sigma^2} \Delta t \frac{(q-1)^2}{(q-1)^2} + O(\Delta t^{3/2})$$

Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(1 + \frac{1}{\sigma} \sqrt{\Delta t}\right)^{q/q-1} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \sqrt{\Delta t}\right)^{q/q-1} \\ &= 2 + \frac{1^2}{\sigma^2} \Delta t \frac{q}{(q-1)^2} + O(\Delta t^{3/2}) \end{aligned}$$

So that

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[\left(1 + \frac{1}{\sigma} \sqrt{\Delta t}\right)^{q/q-1} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \sqrt{\Delta t}\right)^{q/q-1} \right]^{q-1} \\ &= 2^{q-1} \left[1 + \frac{1^2}{2\sigma^2} \frac{q}{(q-1)^2} \Delta t + O(\Delta t^{3/2}) \right]^{q-1} \end{aligned}$$

$$2^{q-1} \left[1 + \frac{d^2}{2\sigma^2} \frac{q}{q-1} \Delta t + o(\Delta t^{3/2}) \right]$$

Similarly

$$(1 + \rho \Delta t)^q = 1 + q\rho \Delta t + o(\Delta t^2)$$

Therefore

$$c = \frac{1 + q\rho \Delta t + o(\Delta t^2)}{1 + \frac{d^2}{2\sigma^2} \frac{q}{q-1} \Delta t + o(\Delta t^{3/2})}$$

$$= 1 + \left(q\rho - \frac{d^2}{2\sigma^2} \frac{q}{q-1} \right) \Delta t + o(\Delta t^{3/2})$$

Now:

$$c^N = \exp \left\{ \frac{T}{\Delta t} \ln \left[1 + \left(q\rho - \frac{d^2}{2\sigma^2} \frac{q}{q-1} \right) \Delta t + o(\Delta t^{3/2}) \right] \right\}$$

$$T \left(q\rho - \frac{d^2}{2\sigma^2} \frac{q}{q-1} \right) + o(\Delta t^{1/2})$$

$$\underset{\substack{N \rightarrow \infty \\ \Leftrightarrow \Delta t \rightarrow 0}}{\sim} \exp \left\{ T \left(q\rho - \frac{d^2}{2\sigma^2} \frac{q}{q-1} \right) \right\}$$

When $N \rightarrow \infty$ the optimal reward is

$$x^q \exp \left\{ T \left(q\rho - \frac{d^2}{2\sigma^2} \frac{q}{q-1} \right) \right\}$$